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Abstract— Despite a variety of theoretical-sound 
techniques have been proposed for biometric template 
protection, there is rarely practical solution that guarantees 
non-invertibility, cancellability, non-linkability and 
performance simultaneously. In this paper, a ranking-based 
representational transformation is proposed for fingerprint 
templates. The proposed method transforms a real-valued 
feature vector into index code such that the pairwise-order 
measure in the resultant codes are closely correlated with 
rank similarity measure. Such a ranking based technique 
offers two major merits: 1) Resilient to noises/perturbations 
in numeric values; and 2) Highly nonlinear embedding based 
on partial order statistics. The former takes care of the 
accuracy performance mitigating numeric 
noises/perturbations while the latter offers strong non-
invertible transformation via nonlinear feature embedding 
from Euclidean to Rank space that leads to toughness in 
inversion. The experimental results demonstrate reasonable 
accuracy performance on benchmark FVC2002 and 
FVC2004 fingerprint databases, thus confirm the 
proposition of the rank correlation. Moreover, the security 
and privacy analysis justify the strong capability against the 
existing major privacy attacks. 
Keywords— cancellable biometrics; template protection; rank 
correlation; polynamial kernel, pairwise-order 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Biometrics has been integrated in large-scale personal 
verification and identification systems. The rapid proliferation 
of biometric applications leads to a large number of databases 
that stores the biometric templates. Public worries about the 
security and privacy of biometric template if stolen or 
compromised. Such concerns are attributed to the strong binding 
of individuals and privacy, and further complicated by the fact 
that biometric traits are irrevocable. Given the above threats, a 
number of proposals have been reported for protecting biometric 
templates. It remains as a challenge task for designing a 
biometric template protection (BTP) scheme with the following 
criteria [1, 2]: 
 Non-linkability/Diversity. It should be computationally 
hard to differentiate multiple instances of the protected 
biometric reference derived from the same biometric 
trait. Non-linkability prevents the cross-matching across 
different applications. 
 Cancelability. A new template can be reissued once the 
old template is compromised. 
 Non-invertibility/Irreversibility. It should be 
computationally infeasible to derive the original 
biometric template from the protected template and/or 
the helper data. 
 Performance preservation. The accuracy performance 
of a protected system should be preserved or improved. 
Generally, the approaches available in literature can be 
broadly divided into two categories: feature transformation (or 
cancellable biometrics) and biometric cryptosystems (or helper 
data method). Biometric cryptosystem serves the purpose of 
either securing the cryptographic key using biometric feature 
(key binding) or directly generating the cryptographic key from 
biometric feature (key generation) [2]. On the other hand, 
cancellable biometrics [3] is truly meant designed for biometric 
template protection. It refers to the irreversible transform applied 
on the biometric template to generate (and store) the transformed 
template such that ensuring the security and privacy of the 
original biometric template. If a cancellable biometric template 
is compromised, a new template can be re-generated from the 
same biometrics. The schemes of cancellable biometrics in 
literature vary according to different biometric modalities. 
A. Literature Review 
In the past decades, numerous biometric template protection 
schemes have been proposed for security and privacy protection. 
Several decent review papers exist in this topic such as 
[2][4][5][6]. Another inspiring work reported by Nandakumar & 
Jain [7] recently, where the performance gap between theory and 
practice is focused while the promising direction is highlighted 
to bridge the gap. We refer the readers to explore more details 
about biometric template security from the aforementioned 
          
 
review papers. In this paper, we focus a few most recent and 
relevant fingerprint related protection schemes. 
Ferrara et al. [8] proposed a recovery algorithm to reveal the 
original minutiae from the minutia cylinder-code (MCC) 
template, a state-of-the-art fingerprint descriptor proposed by 
Cappelli et al. [9]. A non-invertible scheme on MCC is hence 
proposed, namely protected minutia cylinder-code (P-MCC) by 
using binary principle component analysis. Although, the 
cancellability is not addressed in original P-MCC, later, a two-
factor protection scheme on P-MCC, namely 2P-MCC [10] is 
proposed to make the protected MCC template cancellable. The 
specific design of MCC and its variations for point set data limits 
the usage in other popular biometric modalities like face and iris. 
Recently, a more generalized template protection technique, 
namely bloom filter has been introduced for iris [11], face [12] 
and fingerprint [13] respectively. Bloom filter demonstrates a 
well adaption for the popular biometric modalities. However, 
despite the decent performance preservation, the security and 
privacy of bloom filter based schemes remains unresolved. For 
instance, Hermans et al. [14] demonstrated a simple and 
effective attack scheme that matches two protected templates 
derived from a same IrisCode using different secret bit vectors, 
thus break the requirement of non-linkability. Moreover, a 
security analysis also reported reveals that the false positive or 
recover the key can be accomplished with a low attack 
complexity of 225 and 22 to 28 attempts respectively [14]. Bringer 
et al. [15] further analyzed the non-linkability of the protected 
templates generated from two different IrisCode of the same 
subject. They revealed when the key space is too small, a brute 
force attack would be succeeded while the 
identification/authentication rate declines if the key size is 
increased. Experiment confirms the vulnerability of 
irreversibility with block width of 16 or 32 in Bloom filter 
scheme. 
Sandhya & Prasad [16] proposed a k-nearest neighbor 
structure from fingerprint minutia to construct a fixed-length 
binary representation that is invariant to rotation and translation. 
A discrete Fourier transform is applied on the binary 
representation to result a complex vector that is multiplied with 
Gaussian random matrix to obtain a cancellable template. This 
technique can achieve reasonable recognition accuracy. 
However, the security of the proposed method is insufficiently 
analyzed. Meanwhile, Wang and Hu [17] proposed a blind 
system identification approach to protect biometric template. 
This is motivated by fact that source signal cannot be recovered 
if the identifiability is dissatisfied in blind system identification. 
This new approach exhibits well accuracy performance 
preservation and the irreversibility of transformed template is 
justified theoretically and experimentally. However, the 
protected template against other major attacks (e.g. ARM) is 
unknown. 
In this paper, we report a generic method for biometric 
template protection based on rank correlation measure. The 
proposed method is inspired from the “Winner Takes All” 
hashing [18] that originally meant for solving the fast similarity 
search problem. In connection with biometric template 
protection, several alternations have to be made to meet the 
specific requirements of biometric template protection. In short, 
the protected template is able to (1) conceal the information of 
the original biometric features reliably; (2) satisfy the 
performance preservation and cancellability; and (3) incredibly 
easy for practical applications. We demonstrate the feasibility of 
this method with fingerprint modality. 
B. Preliminary 
The current section describes the “Winner Takes All” 
(WTA) on which our work is based. Yagnik et al. [18] 
introduced WTA hashing for fast similarity search. The basic 
idea of WTA is to compute the ordinal embedding of an input 
feature based on the partial order statistics. More specifically, 
WTA is a non-linear transformation based on the implicit order 
rather than the absolute/numeric values of the input feature, and 
therefore, offers certain degree of resilience to numeric noise 
while giving a good indication of inherent similarity between the 
compared items/vectors [18]. The overall WTA hashing 
procedure can be summarized into four steps as shown in Fig. 1: 
 Perform H random permutations on the input 
feature 𝐗ϵℝ𝑛, 𝑛 is the dimension of the input feature 𝐗. 
 Select the first 𝐾 (i.e. window size) items of the permuted 
input feature. 
 Choose the largest element within the K items. 
 Record the corresponding index value using log2𝐾 bits. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Overall procedure of WTA (adopted from [18]). 
II. PROPOSED METHOD 
Going along with WTA, in this Section, we present a rank-
based representational transformation for biometric template 
protection. The overall transformation is illustrated in Fig 2. 
Assume an input feature vector 𝐗ϵℝ𝑛 and 𝑚 independent hash 
functions 𝐻(𝐗) = {ℎ𝑖(𝐗)|𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚} where each hash 
function consists of 𝑝 degree of polynomial kernel. 𝑚 and 𝑝 are 
determined empirically. The hashed code is generated by 
concatenating the outputs from 𝑚 independent hash functions, 
therefore, the length of protected template is 𝑚. The procedure 
of the proposed method is described as follows: 
 Random Permutation: For each 𝐻(𝐗), generating a 
permutation set 𝜃 consists of p randomly generated 
permutation seeds. Then the input feature vector 𝐗 is 
permuted using the permutation seeds to generate 
permuted template, ?̂? = {?̂?𝑗ϵℝ
𝑛|𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑝}. 
          
 
 Hardamard Product-code Generation: Generate the 
𝑝th ordered Hardamard product code by taking the 
element-wise multiplication of all the permuted 
templates that can be described as ?̅? = ∏ (?̂?𝑗)
𝑝
𝑗=1 . In this 
manner, 𝑝 is regarded as a 𝑝th degree of polynomial 
kernel. 
 For each product code, 𝐗 select the first 𝑘 elements, 
while 1 < 𝑘 < 𝑛. 
 Record the index of the maximum value in the first 𝑘 
elements (or k-size window), and denote it as t. 
 Repeat step 1 to 4 using different permutations set 𝜃(𝑙,𝑖), 
where 𝑙 ϵ [1, 𝑝], 𝑖 ϵ[1, 𝑚] to form a 1 × 𝑚  hashed code 
𝑻 = {𝑡𝑖 ∈ ℤ
𝒏|𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚}, 𝑻 ∈ [0, 𝑘]. 
In the event of template compromise, 𝑚 independent hash 
functions, 𝐻(𝐗) = {ℎ𝑖(𝐗)|𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚} are regenerated with 
different random permutation seeds to replace the compromised 
hash functions. A new template can be re-issued by repeating the 
steps 1 to 5 described above. The effectiveness of cancellability 
is experimentally verified in Section 4.3. In real world scenario, 
the permutation seed is user-specific for cancellability. 
However, lost token/seed scenario should be focused as it is 
closely associated to accuracy performance, security and privacy 
attacks [1, 19]. To evaluate the lost token scenario, our 
experiment is performed with same permutation seed for all 
subjects. The accuracy performance in lost token scenario is 
presented in Section 4.2. 
Algorithm 1. Rank Hashing with Polynomial Kernel 
Input: Feature vector 𝐗, p degree of polynomial kernel, number of 
random permutation m, window size k 
For each polynomial kernel 𝜃(𝑙,𝑖), 𝑖 ϵ[1, 𝑚], 𝑙 ϵ [1, 𝑝] 
 
Step 1: Permute elements in 𝐗 based on 𝜃(𝑖,𝑙), ?̂? = 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚(𝐗), 
perm(.) refers random permutation function 
 
Step 2: Initialize ith hashed code 𝑡𝑖 = 0 
 
Step 3: Hardamard product-code generation and output hashed 
codes 
For j=1: k 
        Set  𝐗(𝑗) = ∏ (?̂?𝑙(𝑗))
𝑝
𝑙=1  
         if  𝐗(𝑗) > 𝐗(𝑡𝑖) then 𝑡𝑖 = 𝑗 
End for 
Output: Hashed code 𝑻 = {𝑡𝑖|𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚} and 𝑻 ∈ [1, 𝑘] 
A. Matching 
Briefly, rank correlation refers to the measurement of ordinal 
association. In this context, rank correlation measure (also 
known as ordinal measure) is based on the relative ordering of 
values in a given range. It is known as a useful measurement for 
pixel correspondence in stereo matching [20]. Furthermore, rank 
correlation has been well studied as similarity measurement 
between two feature representations, which is defined by the 
degree to which their feature dimension rankings agree [18]. The 
pairwise-order, 𝑃𝑂 is the simplest similarity measure for rank 
correlation [18]. The exposition of rank correlation and PO are 
given in [21]. 
Assume two hashed codes, enrolled 𝑻𝑒 = {𝑡𝑖
𝑒|𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚} 
and query 𝑻𝑞 = {𝑡𝑗
𝑞|𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑚}). The PO function can be 
defined as follows: 
𝑃𝑂(𝑻𝑒 , 𝑻𝑞) = ∑ ∑ 𝑄 ((𝑻𝑖
𝑒 − 𝑻𝑗
𝑒)(𝑻𝑖
𝑞 − 𝑻𝑗
𝑞))
𝑗<𝑖
𝑖
= ∑ 𝑅𝑖(𝑻
𝑒 , 𝑻𝑞)
𝑖
 
where  𝑅𝑖(𝑻
𝑒 , 𝑻𝑞) = |𝐿(𝑻𝑒 , 𝑖) ∩ 𝐿(𝑻𝑞 , 𝑖)| 
𝐿(𝑻𝑒, 𝑖) = {𝑗|𝑻𝑒(𝑖) > 𝑻𝑒(𝑗)} 
𝐿(𝑻𝑞 , 𝑖) = {𝑗|𝑻𝑞(𝑖) > 𝑻𝑞(𝑗)} 
𝑄(𝑧) =  {
1 𝑧 > 0
0 𝑧 ≤ 0
 
The operational PO function can be reformulated as [18]: 
𝑆𝑘(𝑻
𝑒 , 𝑻𝑞) =  
∑ (𝑅𝑖(𝑻
𝑒,𝑻𝑞)
𝑘−1
)𝑛−1𝑖=0
(𝑛
𝑘
)
 
According to the rank correlation measure above, the 
proposed method essentially follows the intrinsic nature of PO 
measure (e.g. highest order selection). Thus, this similarity 
measure can be used to compute the similarity score of two 
distinct biometric features after ranking-based transformation as 
described in Algorithm 1. Mathematically, 𝑆𝑘(𝑻
𝑒 , 𝑻𝑞) 
represents the probability of collision given by a random 
permutation 𝜃 on hashed codes 𝑻𝑒, 𝑻𝑞 . In this context, a 
collision, 𝑐 refers to the maximum value appeared in the 
identical position for both 𝑻𝑒 , 𝑻𝑞 within a k-size window, i.e. 
𝑐 ← {𝑻𝑖
𝑒 = 𝑻𝑖
𝑞}, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑘. The higher probability of collision 
implies higher similarity of 𝑻𝑒 , 𝑻𝑞 and vice-versa. In our 
implementation, the number of collision is calculated by 
counting the number of 0 after the element-wise subtraction of 
𝑻𝑒 , 𝑻𝑞 is performed.  
III. EXPERIMENTS AND DISCUSSIONS  
In this paper, a real-valued and fixed-length fingerprint 
vector with length 299 that generated from MCC and KPCA [22] 
is used as input data to evaluate the proposed method. We refer 
the readers for the details about the fingerprint vector 
construction in [23]. The evaluations are conducted on six public 
fingerprint datasets, FVC2002 (DB1, DB2, DB3) [24] and 
FVC2004 (DB1, DB2, DB3) [24]. Each dataset consists of 100 
users with 8 samples per user. In total, there are 800 (100×8) 
fingerprint images in each dataset. The performance accuracy of 
the proposed method is assessed using Equal Error Rate (EER) 
and the genuine-imposter distribution. Noted that since the 
random permutation is applied, to avoid the bias of single 
random permutation, the EERs is calculated by taking an 
average of EER repeated for 5 times. 
For matching protocol, as described in [23], 1st to 3rd samples 
of each identity are used as training samples to generate the 
fixed-length fingerprint representation; thus, the rest samples 
(i.e. 4th – 8th) of each identity are used in this experiment. There 
are 500 (100×5) in total. Within this subset of data, The 
Fingerprint Verification Competition (FVC) [24] protocol is 
applied across the six data sets, which yields 1000 genuine 
matching scores and 4950 imposter matching scores for each 
data set. 
          
 
A. Effect of window size k, polynomial kernel p, and number 
of hashing functions m 
We first investigated the effect of window size k with respect 
to the performance in terms of EER. In this experiment, k is 
varied from 50, 80, 100, 128, 156, 200 to 250 by leveling off m 
(m=600). The identical setting is repeated for p=[2,3,4,5]. Then, 
Fig. 3 shows the curves of “EER (%)-vs-k” using the 
aforementioned parameters setting on FVC2002 DB1 and DB2. 
We can observe that: 
 The EER drops gradually when larger k is applied and 
levels off when k becomes large. This is not surprised 
that smaller k leads to less feature components taking into 
account, which leads to insufficient discriminability; 
while larger k indicates more salient features for 
matching; 
 The smaller p, the lower EER, i.e. better performance. 
Algorithm 1 (step 3) tells us that the Hardamard product-
code is obtained by element-wise multiplication of the p 
permuted templates, 𝐗(𝑗) = ∏ (?̂?𝑙(𝑗))
𝑝
𝑙=1 . Such an 
operation heightens the difficulty against inversion at the 
expense of introducing distortion in the product code as 
noises may involve in one or multiple permuted 
templates. Thus, it is expected that the performance 
drops with large p. This also demonstrates the common 
trade-off suffered in cancellable biometrics, namely 
performance-security trade-off. 
 
 
Fig. 3: The curves of “EER (%) vs k” on FVC2002 DB1 and DB2. 
Apart from the above, we also examined the relation between 
the number of hashing functions m and EER. Evaluation has 
been carried out by increasing the m from 5, 10, 50, 100, 300, 
500, 800 and 1000 while fixing k=250, and p=2. As expected, a 
better EER can be attained with respect to the increment of m 
and level off at large m as illustrated in Fig. 4. Since 
randomization (i.e. random permutation) is involved in the 
hashing functions, Central limit theorem [25] tells us that the 
random vector constructed is approximately Gaussian 
distributed with sufficiently large m. Experimental evidence 
suggests that with m=200 and k=250, we obtain good 
performance accuracy. This resembles a well-known instance, 
namely Kernelized Locality-Sensitive Hashing (KLSH) [26]. 
 
Fig. 4: The curves of “EER (%) vs m” on FVC2002 (DB1, DB2 and DB3). 
B. Accuracy Performance Evaluation 
In this section, the accuracy performance experiments on 
FVC2002 and FVC2004 using the best parameters found in the 
previous section is carried out. Table 1 presents the accuracy 
results as well as comparisons with the baseline system and other 
methods. It can be observed that: 
1) the performance accuracy of the proposed method does 
not degrade significantly with respect to its fingerprint vector 
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TABLE I.  PERFORMANCE ACCURACY (LOST TOKEN/SEED SCENARIO) 
AND COMPARISON 
Methods FVC2002 
DB1 
FVC2002 
DB2 
FVC2002 
DB3 
FVC2004 
DB1 
FVC2004 
DB2 
FVC2004 
DB3 
Without Template protection 
MCC [9] 0.60% 0.59% 3.91% 3.97% 5.22% 3.82% 
Fixed-length 
Representation 
[23] 
0.20% 0.19% 2.30% 4.70% 3.13% 2.80% 
With Template Protection 
Proposed 0.43% 2.11% 6.47% 4.45% 7.87% 8.29% 
2P-MCC64,64 
[10] 
3.3% 1.8% 7.8% 6.3% - - 
Bloom Filter 
[27] 
2.3% 1.8% 6.6% 13.4% 8.1% 9.7% 
Wang & Hu 
[17] 
4% 3% 8.5% - - - 
 
          
 
counterpart [18]; this confirms the rank correlation after 
transformation; 
2) the proposed method outperforms the existing fingerprint 
minutiae based template protection methods [10, 17, 27]; this is 
attributed to the superior MCC descriptor and the performance 
preservation traits of the ranking based transformation. 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
A. Non-invertibility Analysis 
Non-invertibility in this context refers to the computational 
hardness in restoring the fingerprint vector from the hashed code 
with and without helper data. Here, we assume the adversary 
manages retrieve the hashed codes and he knows well hashing 
algorithm as well as the corresponding parameters (e.g. m, k, p 
and permutation seeds). We noted that the proposed ranking-
based transformation converts the real-valued feature into index 
value (i.e. hashed code). There is no clue for an adversary to 
guess the fingerprint vector information directly from the stolen 
hashed code alone without other information. The way for the 
adversary to attack is only to guess the real-value directly. In the 
worst case, assume the adversary learns the minimum and 
maximum values of the feature components. Let’s take 
FVC2002 DB1 as an example, the minimum and maximum 
values of the feature components are -0.2504 and 0.2132 
respectively. The adversary has to examine from -0.2504, -
0.2503, -0.2502 and so on, until the maximum 0.2132. Thus, 
there are totally 4636 possibilities. In our implementation, the 
precision is fixed at four decimal digits, the possibility of 
guessing a single feature component of fingerprint vector 
requires 4636 attempts (≈ 212). Thus, the entire 299 feature 
components require around 212×299 = 23588 attempts in total. 
The possibilities to correctly guess a single and entire feature 
components are presented in Table 2. Obviously, such 
possibilities are computational infeasible. 
B. Attacks via Record Multiplicity (ARM) 
ARM refers to a privacy attack, which utilizes multiple 
compromised protected templates with and without knowledge 
and parameters that associated to the algorithm to reconstruct the 
original biometric template [28]. In our case, ARM is 
computationally hard to gain the numerical value as the stored 
templates have been transformed into rank space that is not 
correlated with original space. The complexity to gain the real-
valued feature vector is presented in Table 2. The concern for 
our specific case is whether ARM is feasible to gain illegitimate 
access. Theoretically, if knowing the order of the feature 
components (not necessary the numerical value) and the 
permutation seeds, an elaborate faked feature vector can be 
formed. Consequently, the maximum value resulted from the 
product of two permuted feature vectors appears in the desired 
rank/position. The system thus can be broken. 
Now, the complexity for ARM is shifted to the complexity 
of determining the order of the feature components in the 
fingerprint vector. For instance, let 𝐗 = {𝑥𝑎 ,  𝑥𝑏 ,  𝑥𝑐} be the 
input feature, with 𝑝 = 2 and two randomly permuted feature 
vectors ?̂?1 = {𝑥𝑐 ,  𝑥𝑎 ,  𝑥𝑏} and ?̂?2 = {𝑥𝑏 ,  𝑥𝑐 ,  𝑥𝑎}. The 
Hardamard product code ?̅? = {𝑥𝑏𝑥𝑐 , 𝑥𝑎𝑥𝑐 , 𝑥𝑎𝑥𝑏} can be 
computed. Assume 𝑥𝑎𝑥𝑐  is the largest component after 
Hardamard multiplication, i.e. 
𝑥𝑎𝑥𝑐 = max (∏ (?̂?𝑙(𝑗))
2
𝑙=1 ) , 𝑗 = 1,2,3. Thus, two inequalities 
can be derived as follow: 𝑥𝑎𝑥𝑐 > 𝑥𝑏𝑥𝑐  and 𝑥𝑎𝑥𝑐 > 𝑥𝑎𝑥𝑏. We 
can further reason that for 𝑥𝑎 > 𝑥𝑏 and 𝑥𝑐 > 𝑥𝑏, the adversary 
can retrieve the entire order information (e.g. 𝑥𝑎 > 𝑥𝑐 > 𝑥𝑏) by 
repeating this process using multiple hashed codes. However, in 
practice, our feature components contain both positive and 
negative values. For instance, let 𝐗 = {𝑥𝑎 ,  𝑥𝑏 ,  𝑥𝑐} = {-0.2, 0.5, 
-0.1}, by using 𝑥𝑎𝑥𝑐 > 𝑥𝑏𝑥𝑐 , ie. (−0.2) × (−0.1) > (0.5) ×
(−0.1), we obtain (−0.2) < (0.5), hence 𝑥𝑎 < 𝑥𝑏 . This is 
contradicted with 𝑥𝑎 > 𝑥𝑏. Therefore, the inequality reasoning 
only valid under the assumption where the feature values are all 
with coefficient +1. We now can conclude that the inequality 
relation is insufficient for launching ARM effectively. 
 
Fig. 5: The genuine, imposter, and pseudo-imposter distribution with 𝑝 =
2, 𝑘 = 128, 𝑚 = 600 on FVC2002 DB1. 
C. Cancellability 
In this section, cancellability is evaluated by conducting the 
experiment where 101 hashed codes for each fingerprint vector 
are generated with 101 sets distinct random permutation seeds, 
and then the first hashed code is matched with the other 100 
hashed codes. The entire process is repeated and produces 100 
× (5×100) = 50000 pseudo-imposter scores. The genuine, 
TABLE II.  COMPLEXITY TO INVERT SINGLE AND ENTIRE FEATURE 
COMPONENTS. 
Databases Min value 
with four 
decimal 
precision 
Max 
value 
with four 
decimal 
precision 
Possibilities 
for single 
feature 
component 
Total 
possibilities for 
entire feature 
FVC2002 
DB1 
-0.2504 0.2132 4636≈ 212 212×299 = 23588 
FVC2002 
DB2 
-0.2409 0.2484 4893≈ 212 212×299 = 23588 
FVC2002 
DB3 
-0.1919 0.2372 4291≈ 212 212×299 = 23588 
FVC2004 
DB1 
-0.2487 0.1748 4235≈ 212 212×299 = 23588 
FVC2004 
DB2 
-0.2357 0.1950 4307≈ 212 212×299 = 23588 
FVC2004 
DB3 
-0.1947 0.1796 3742≈ 211 212×299 = 23289 
 
          
 
imposter, and pseudo-imposter distribution are computed with 
𝑝 = 2, 𝑘 = 128, 𝑚 = 600 are given in Fig. 5. Note that the 
numbers of scores are different for the imposter and pseudo-
imposter matching, this is because in pseudo- imposter 
matching, we only focus on the matching scores between the 
first hashed code and the newly generated hashed code for each 
fingerprint vector (same user) for cancellability evaluation. 
From Fig. 5, a large degree of overlapping occurs between the 
imposter and pseudo-imposter distributions. This implies the 
newly generated hashed codes with the given 100 random 
permutation sets are distinctive even though it is generated from 
the identical fingerprint vector. In terms of verification 
performance, we obtain EER = 0.16% in which intersection of 
genuine and pseudo-imposter distribution is taken. This verifies 
that the proposed method satisfies the cancellability property 
requirement. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we presented a ranking-based transformation 
for fingerprint template protection. Yet, the proposed method is 
not only limited in fingerprint modality, other popular biometric 
modalities (e.g. face) with real-valued representation are also 
applicable. It is worthy to note that binary representation can be 
easily adopted by taking the position of first ‘1’ in this method. 
In view of the template protection design criteria, the proposed 
method enables performance preservation thank to the nice 
property of rank correlation and strong capability against the 
existing major security and privacy attacks, thus comply with 
non-invertibility and non-linkability criteria. Experiment results 
suggest that cancellable property is also achieved. Moreover, the 
simplistic nature makes the development and deployment of the 
proposed method truly practical likely. 
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